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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-820
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METROPOLITAN STEVEDORE COMPANY, PETI-
TIONER v. JOHN RAMBO et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 12, 1995]

  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Section 22 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1437, as amended, 33
U. S. C. 922 (LHWCA), allows for modification of a
disability award -on the ground of a change in condi-
tions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact.-
The question in this case is whether a party may seek
modification on the ground of -change in conditions-
when there has been no change in the employee's
physical condition but rather an increase in the employ-
ee's wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new
skills.

                            I
  In 1980, respondent John Rambo injured his back and
leg while working as a longshore frontman for petitioner
Metropolitan Stevedore Company.  Rambo filed a claim
with the Department of Labor that was submitted to an
Administrative Law Judge.  After Rambo and petitioner
stipulated that Rambo sustained a 2212% permanent
partial disability and a corresponding $120.24 decrease
in his $534.38 weekly wage, the ALJ, pursuant to
LHWCA 8(c)(21) awarded Rambo 6623% of that figure,
or $80.16 per week.  App. 5.  Because the ALJ also
found that Rambo's disability was not due solely to his
work-related injury and was -materially and substan-
tially greater than that which would have resulted from
the subsequent injury alone,- LHWCA 8(f)(1), 33
U. S. C. 908(f)(1), he limited the period of petitioner's
liability to pay compensation to 104 weeks.  Ibid.; App.
6.  Later payments were to issue from the special fund
administered by respondent Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), LHWCA
8(f)(2), 33 U. S. C. 908(f)(2).  Employers (or their
insurance carriers) contribute to the fund based on their
outstanding liabilities.  See LHWCA 44(c)(2)(B), 33
U. S. C. 944(c)(2)(B).
  After the award, Rambo began attending crane school.
With the new skills so acquired, he obtained longshore
work as a crane operator.  He also worked in his spare
time as a heavy lift truck operator.  Between 1985 and
1990, Rambo's average weekly wages ranged between
$1,307.81 and $1,690.50, more than three times his pre-
injury earnings, though his physical condition remained
unchanged.  In light of the increased wage-earning
capacity, petitioner, which may seek modification even
when the special fund has assumed responsibility for
payments, see LHWCA 22, 33 U. S. C. 922; 20 CFR
702.148(b) (1994), filed an application to modify the
disability award under LHWCA 22.  Petitioner asserted
there had been a -change in conditions- so that respond-
ent was no longer -disabled- under the Act.  The ALJ
agreed that an award may be modified based on changes
in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even absent a
change in physical condition.  After discounting wage
increases due to inflation and considering petitioner's
risk of job loss and other employment prospects, the ALJ
concluded Rambo -no longer has a wage-earning capacity
loss- and terminated his disability payments.  App. 68.
The Benefits Review Board affirmed, relying on Fleet-
wood v. Newport News Shipping & Dry Dock Co., 16
BRBS 282 (1984), aff'd, 776 F. 2d 1225 (CA4 1985),
which held that -change in condition[s]- means change
in wage-earning capacity, as well as change in physical
condition.  App. 73.  A panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed.  Rambo v. Director, OWCP,
28 F. 3d 86 (1994).  Rejecting the Fourth Circuit's
approach in Fleetwood, the Ninth Circuit held that
LHWCA 22 authorizes modification of an award only
where there has been a change in the claimant's
physical condition.  We granted certiorari to resolve this
split, 513 U. S. ___ (1995), and now reverse.

                           II
  The LHWCA is a comprehensive scheme to provide
compensation -in respect of disability or death of an
employee . . . if the disability or death results from an
injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
States.-  LHWCA 3, 33 U. S. C. 903(a).  Section 22 of
the Act provides for modification of awards -on the
ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake
in a determination of fact.-  33 U. S. C. 922.  In
Rambo's view and that of the Ninth Circuit, -change in
conditions- means change in physical condition and does
not include changes in other conditions relevant to the
initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-
earning capacity.  In our view, this interpretation of
-change in conditions- cannot stand in the face of the
language, structure, and purpose of the Act.

                            A
  Neither Rambo nor the Ninth Circuit has attempted
to base their position on the language of the statute,
where analysis in a statutory construction case ought to
begin, for -when a statute speaks with clarity to an
issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all
but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.-
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469,
475 (1992); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190
(1991).
  Section 22 of the Act provides the only way to modify
an award once it has issued.  The section states:

    -Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of
  any party in interest (including an employer or carrier
  which has been granted relief under section 908(f) of
  this title), on the ground of a change in conditions or
  because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the
  deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may,
  at any time prior to one year after the date of the last
  payment of compensation, . . . or at any time prior to
  one year after the rejection of a claim, review a
  compensation case . . . and . . . issue a new compensa-
  tion order which may terminate, continue, reinstate,
  increase, or decrease such compensation, or award
  compensation.-  33 U. S. C. 922.

  On two occasions we have construed the phrase
-mistake in a determination of fact- and observed that
nothing in the statutory language supports attempts to
limit it to particular kinds of factual errors or to cases
involving new evidence or changed circumstances.  See
O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc., 404 U. S.
254, 255-256 (1971) (per curiam); Banks v. Chicago
Grain Trimmers Assn., Inc., 390 U. S. 459, 465 (1968).
The language of 22 also provides no support for
Rambo's narrow construction of the phrase -change in
conditions.-  The use of -conditions,- a word in the
plural, suggests that Congress did not intend to limit
the bases for modifying awards to a single condition,
such as an employee's physical health.  See 2A N.
Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 47.34,
p. 274 (5th rev. ed. 1992) (-`Ordinarily the legislature by
use of a plural term intends a reference to more than
one matter or thing'-) (quoting N. Y. Statutes Law 252
(McKinney 1971)); cf. 1 U. S. C. 1 (-[W]ords importing
the plural include the singular-).  Rather, under the
-normal- or -natural reading,- Estate of Cowart, supra,
at 477, the applicable -conditions- are those that entitled
the employee to benefits in the first place, the same
conditions on which continuing entitlement is predicated.
  Our interpretation is confirmed by the language of
LHWCA 2(10) and 8(c)(21).  Section 2(10) defines
-disability- as -incapacity because of injury to earn the
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
injury in the same or any other employment.-  33
U. S. C. 902(10).  For certain injuries the statute
creates a conclusive presumption of incapacity to earn
wages and sets compensation at 6623% of the claimant's
actual wage for a fixed number of weeks, according to a
statutory schedule.  See LHWCA 8(c)(1)-(20), (22), 33
U. S. C. 908(c)(1)-20, (22).  When these types of
scheduled injuries occur, a claimant simply proves the
relevant physical injury and compensation follows for a
finite period of time.  See Bath Iron Works Corp. v.
Director, OWCP, 506 U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (1993) (slip op.,
at 3, n. 4); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director,
OWCP, 449 U. S. 268, 269 (1980).  -In all other cases,-
however, the statute provides -the compensation shall be
6623% per centum of the difference between the average
weekly wages of the employee and the employee's wage-
earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or
otherwise, payable during the continuance of partial
disability.-  LHWCA 8(c)(21), 33 U. S. C. 908(c)(21).
For these non-scheduled injuries, the type at issue in
this case, loss of wage-earning capacity is an element of
the claimant's case, for without the statutory presump-
tion that accompanies scheduled injuries, a claimant is
not -disabled- unless he proves -incapacity because of
injury to earn the wages.-  LHWCA 2(10), 33 U. S. C.
902(10).  See Bath Iron Works, supra, at ___ (slip op.,
at 2-3); Potomac Electric Power Co., supra, at 269-270.
These two sections make it clear that compensation, as
an initial matter, is predicated on loss of wage-earning
capacity, and that such compensation should continue
only -during the continuance of partial disability,-
LHWCA 8(c)(21), 33 U. S. C. 908(c)(21), i.e., during
the continuance of the -incapacity . . . to earn the
wages,- LHWCA 2(10), 33 U. S. C. 902(10).  Section
22 accommodates this statutory requirement by provid-
ing for modification of an award on the ground of -a
change in conditions.-  33 U. S. C. 922.
  Rambo's insistence on what seems to us a -`narrowly
technical and impractical construction'- of this phrase,
O'Keeffe, supra, at 255 (quoting Luckenbach S. S. Co. v.
Norton, 106 F. 2d 137, 138 (CA3 1939)), does more than
disregard the plain language of 22, 2(10), and 8(c)(21).
It also is inconsistent with the structure and purpose of
the LHWCA.  Like most other workers' compensation
schemes, the LHWCA does not compensate physical
injury alone but the disability produced by that injury.
See LHWCA 3(a), 8, 33 U. S. C. 903(a), 908; see
also 1C A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation
57.11 (1994).  Disability under the LHWCA, defined in
terms of wage-earning capacity, LHWCA 2(10), is in
essence an economic, not a medical concept.  Cf. 3
Larson, supra, at 81.31(e) (-[D]isability in the compen-
sation sense has an economic as well as a medical
component-).  It may be ascertained for nonscheduled
injuries according to the employee's actual earnings, if
they -fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning
capacity,- and if they do not, then with -due regard to
the nature of [the employee's] injury, the degree of
physical impairment, his usual employment and any
other factors or circumstances in the case which may
affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condi-
tion, including the effect of disability as it may naturally
extend into the future.-  LHWCA 8(h), 33 U. S. C.
908(h).  The fundamental purpose of the Act is to com-
pensate employees (or their beneficiaries) for wage-
earning capacity lost because of injury; where that wage-
earning capacity has been reduced, restored, or im-
proved, the basis for compensation changes and the
statutory scheme allows for modification.

                            B
  Given that the language of 22 and the structure of
the Act itself leave little doubt as to Congress' intent,
any argument based on legislative history is of minimal,
if any, relevance.  See Connecticut Nat. Bank v.
Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254, (1992); Ardestani v. INS,
502 U. S. 129, 136 (1991); cf. Intercounty Constr. Corp.
v. Walter, 422 U. S. 1, 8 (1975) (construing ambiguity in
application of 22's 1-year limitations period).  In any
event, we find Rambo's arguments that the legislative
history provides support for his view lacking in force.
  From congressional Reports accompanying amendments
to 22 in 1934, 1938, and 1984, Reports suggesting
Congress was unwilling to extend the 1-year limitations
period in which a party may seek modification, Rambo
would have us infer that Congress intended a narrow
construction of other parts of 22, including the circum-
stances that would justify reopening an award.  We
rejected this very argument in Banks, 390 U. S., at 465,
and its logic continues to elude us.  Congress' decision
to maintain a 1-year limitations period has no apparent
relevance to which changed conditions may justify
modifying an award.
  Rambo next contends that following McCormick S. S.
Co. v. United States Employees' Compensation Comm'n,
64 F. 2d 84 (CA9 1933), the Courts of Appeals unani-
mously held that -change in conditions- refers only to
changes in physical conditions, so Congress's reenact-
ment of the phrase -change in conditions- when it
amended other parts of 22 as late as 1984 must be
understood to endorse that approach.  We have often
relied on Congress's -reenact[ment of] statutory language
that has been given a consistent judicial construction,-
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 21); see
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 566-567 (1988), in
particular where Congress was aware of or made
reference to that judicial construction, see Brown v.
Gardner, 513 U. S. ___, ___ (1994); United States v.
Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351, 359 (1957).  The cases in the
relevant period, however, were based on a misreading of
McCormick, supra, which did not reject the idea that
22 included a change in wage-earning capacity, but
merely expressed doubt that 22 -applies to a change in
earnings due to economic conditions,- 64 F. 2d, at 85;
they involved dicta not holdings, see, e.g., Pillsbury v.
Alaska Packers Assn., 85 F. 2d 758, 760 (CA9 1936),
rev'd on other grounds, 301 U. S. 174 (1937); Burley
Welding Works, Inc. v. Lawson, 141 F. 2d 964, 966
(1944); General Dynamics Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 673
F. 2d 23, 25, n. 6 (CA1 1982) (per curiam); and they
were not uniform in their approach, see, e.g., Hole v.
Miami Shipyards Corp., 640 F. 2d 769, 772 (CA5 1981)
(-[T]he compensation award may be modified years later
to reflect . . . greater or lesser economic injury-).  Under
these circumstances, we are not persuaded that congres-
sional silence in the reenactment of the phrase -change
in conditions- carries any significance.
  In a related argument, Rambo criticizes petitioner's
reading of 22 because it sweeps away an accumulation
of more than 50 years of dicta.  Far from counseling
hesitation, however, we think this step long overdue.
-[A]ge is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a
statute,- Brown v. Gardner, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7),
and the dictum of Pillsbury and Burley Welding Works
has not even aged with integrity, see, e.g., Fleetwood v.
Newport News Shipping and Dry Dock Co., 16 BRBS 282
(1984); LaFaille v. Benefits Review Board, U. S. Dept. of
Labor, 884 F. 2d 54, 62 (CA2 1989); Avondale Shipyards,
Inc. v. Guidry, 967 F. 2d 1039, 1042, n. 6 (CA5 1992)
(dictum).  Breath spent repeating dicta does not infuse
it with life.  The unnecessary observations of these
Courts of Appeals -are neither authoritative nor persua-
sive.-  McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 482 (1921);
cf. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S. 286,
295 (1970).
  Finally, Rambo argues that including a change in
wage-earning capacity as a change in conditions under
22 will flood the OWCP and the courts with litigation
because parties will request modification every time an
employee's wages change or the economy takes a turn in
one direction or the other.  Experience in the 11 years
since the Benefits Review Board decided Fleetwood,
supra, suggests otherwise, but that argument is, in any
case, better directed at Congress or the Director in her
rulemaking capacity, see LHWCA 39(a), 33 U. S. C.
939(a); Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co., 514 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at
12-13), than at the courts.  It is also based on a
misconception of the LHWCA and our holding today.
We recognize only that an award in a nonscheduled-
injury case may be modified where there has been a
change in wage-earning capacity.  A change in actual
wages is controlling only when actual wages -fairly and
reasonably represent . . . wage-earning capacity.-
LHWCA  8(h), 33 U. S. C 908(h).  Otherwise, wage-
earning capacity may be determined according to the
many factors identified in 8(h), including -any . . .
factors or circumstances in the case which may affect
[the employee's] capacity to earn wages in his disabled
condition, including the effect of disability as it may
naturally extend into the future.-  This circumspect
approach does not permit a change in wage-earning
capacity with every variation in actual wages or tran-
sient change in the economy.  There may be cases
raising difficult questions as to what constitutes a
change in wage-earning capacity, but we need not
address them here.  Rambo acquired additional, market-
able skills and the ALJ, recognizing that higher wages
do not necessarily prove an increase in wage-earning
capacity, took care to account for inflation and risk of
job loss in evaluating Rambo's new -wage-earning
capacity in an open labor market under normal employ-
ment conditions.-  App. 66.
  We hold that a disability award may be modified
under 22 where there is a change in the employee's
wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the
employee's physical condition.  Because Rambo raised
other arguments before the Ninth Circuit that the panel
did not have the opportunity to address, we reverse and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.